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Abstract
It is a widely known theoretical derivation, that the firm’s leverage is negatively related
to volatility of stock returns, although the empirical evidence is still outstanding. To
empirically evaluate the leverage we first complement previous simulation studies by
deriving theoretical predictions of leverage changes on the volatility smile. Even more
important, we empirically test these predictions with an event study using intra-day
Eurex option data and a unique data set of 138 ad-hoc news. For our theoretically
derived predictions we observe that changes in leverage of DAX companies from
1999 to 2014 cause significant changes to the implied volatility smile.
Keywords Implied volatilty smile · Leverage effect · Event study · Tick data
Mathematics Subject Classification C13 · G32 · G14
1 Introduction
The fact that changes in leverage lead to changes in volatility of stock returns is even
before the publication ofModiglianiMillers seminal paper awell-knownphenomenon.
The main idea behind the theory of this phenomenon is that a firm holds assets and
issues equity. The equity holders claim the residual, of which riskiness positively
depends on the leverage. Due to option’s implied volatility being linked to realized
stock volatility, the implied volatility should also depend on the leverage as a ratio
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of market value of debt and equity. Hence, increases in stock prices yield in lower
leverages accompanied by lower volatilities and vice versa.
Black (1976) was the first to show empirically a negative correlation between stock
price returns and the volatility of stock returns, whereas Christie (1982) was the first
who termed this observation leverage effect. However, Black (1976) also gave an
alternative explanation on correlation between stock returns and volatility which he
called the volatility feedback hypothesis. According to him as well as Pindyck (1984),
French et al. (1987), Campbell and Hentschel (1992), or Bekaert and Wu (2000) the
volatility feedback hypothesis explains the increase in volatility after some unexpected
bad news regarding markets or a particular company. The resulting feedback leads to
fluctuating stock prices and induces by statistical definition a higher standard devia-
tion of the stock prices. Due to volatility persistence, investors revise their expected
conditional variance. Lastly, the revised variance yields in higher expected returns
which implies negative stock returns, strengthening the initial shock caused by the
new market information. All in all, similar to the leverage effect the volatility feed-
back hypothesis implies a negative correlation between stock returns and volatility,
since the effect is less pronounced in case of positive returns.
However, in this paper we concentrate on the leverage effect. According to the
leverage effect the volatility of the stock returns is a function of the level of the stock
price. This is in contradiction to the assumption of the Black and Scholesmodel, where
the volatility is constant. On account of being an estimator of the future volatility,
the implied volatility is conditional on the stock returns and prices and lastly on
the moneyness of options. Hence, the characteristic skew of implied volatilities as a
function is an inherent result of the leverage.
Several papers empirically analyze the relationship between stock returns and
mostly realized or expected volatility, not bearing in mind the leverage effect. Hence,
they concentrate on the asymmetric behavior of volatility and differ in terms of the
explicit modelling of a stochastic process for the volatility as well as the frequency
of data in use. Regarding the first point, most of the studies in this category often
model the volatility explicitly as stochastic process, including a non-zero correla-
tion of stock returns and volatility. Contrarily to models like Geske (1979) or Leland
and Toft (1996), they apply for example an autoregressive model, a GARCH-model,
a quadratic variation, or the Heston model in order to find variables that influence
volatility. In addition, the leverage of a firm in their studies is often only one of sev-
eral explanatory variables. In particular, the earlier authors such as Christie (1982),
Schwert (1989), Duffee (1995) or Bekaert and Wu (2000) often apply their methods
on daily or monthly data and paint a more or less ambiguous picture of the correlation
between stock returns and volatility. More recent papers build upon Bollerslev et al.
(2006) usemore advancedmethods and come to the conclusion, that there is a negative
relationship between stock returns and volatility. The main idea of Bollerslev et al.
(2006) is that we are only able to observe the continuous stochastic process at discrete
times. Hence, by approximating the stochastic process of stock returns the results
may be biased because of the so called discretization error. After the application of
bias correction methods, Aït-Sahalia et al. (2013) demonstrate that it is possible to
uncover the presence of a strong leverage effect in high-frequency data. Again based
on high-frequency data,Wang andMykland (2014) suggest adding time-varying lever-
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age in order to explain the variation and clustering in volatility prediction models. In
so doing, the authors worked on a second important aspect of the leverage effect, the
time-dependency, which implies that the leverage changes if book or market values of
equity and debt do so as well.
Additionally, there is also a strand of papers which tests the leverage effect with
respect to implied volatilities as one of several determinants. Among others, Branger
and Schlag (2004) state that the greater the risk-neutral probability for a decline in
stock prices, the steeper the volatility smile. Ciliberti et al. (2009) reveal an over-
reacting of implied volatilities to changes in stock prices. Again, most of the tests
focus on the asymmetric behavior of volatility and do not have explicitly in mind the
leverage effect.
With regard to the literature outlined above, two major ideas for analyzing the
leverage hypothesis emerge.While one part of the studies presented above investigates
the relationship between realized volatility and stock returns, the other part uses stock
returns as one determinant among several drivers of the implied volatilities. Hence,
most of the paperswe referred tomeasure the leverage effect in an indirectway, because
they do not explicitly use the leverage as a variable in their estimation equation. They
use past or contemporaneous stock returns as proxy for the leverage.
Direct tests like Christie (1982) use a proxy for the leverage, when applying book
value of debt in relation to market value of equity to define the leverage. He confirms
a positive correlation between leverage and realized volatility of stock returns. In
contrast, Figlewski and Wang (2000) use implied volatilities to estimate the leverage
effect and find ambiguous results. Again, their analysis foots on book leverage and they
do not control for changes in asset volatility. Contrarily, Choi and Richardson (2016)
include the asset volatility in their estimation equation and measure the leverage with
the help of bonds outstanding, equity market value as well as estimated market value
of loans. They are able to prove a clear impact of the leverage on implied volatility
of options. To a similar conclusion come Toft and Prucyk (1997) by going one step
ahead. They find out that the skew of implied volatilities as a function of moneyness is
more pronounced in case of highly leveraged companies than of more equity financed
companies. An alternative testing strategy is adopted by Geske et al. (2016), who
compare the pricing error of the Black-Scholes model with the error of the compound
option model of Geske (1979), whereby the latter model comprises the leverage effect
as a key component. Due to the mere fact that they approximate the leverage by the
book leverage, they are able to show that the leverage effect affects call option prices
and reduces pricing errors.
In a nutshell, there is evidence that the form of the implied volatility as function
of the moneyness, especially the level and slope is driven by the leverage. However,
some authors apply a specific model, yet other studies do not control for changes in
asset volatilities. Last but not least, all studies have a more or less static proxy for
the leverage as market value of debt over equity. Although some studies measure the
market value of debt by bond and credit spread data, they ground their estimation on
the nominal amounts for the debt at the balance sheet date.
In contrast to previous literature and approaches mentioned, we apply a completely
different method. We use an event study based on the change of the implied volatility
smiles before and after an event dealing with changes in the capital structure of a
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company e.g. events like a takeover, a selling of shares, an increase of equity, an
increase of debt, or a share buyback. Hence, we are able to isolate the leverage effect
from asset value changes as well as from changes in nominal amount of debt since last
disclosure date. In addition, due to using measures of the smile as transformed option
price (level, slope and curvature) we do not ground our study on a specific model.
As events we use the informational content of ad-hoc news relating to the capital
structure of DAX companies between 01.01.1999 and 31.12.2014. Benchmarking the
individual companies changes in the implied volatility smile with the market’s implied
volatility smile allows us to analyze the relation between the idiosyncratic (stock
specific) implied volatility and the leverage effect. Thus, we avoid biases caused by
systematic risk (market wide) changes. With the theoretically developed model and
the empirical analysis, we can demonstrate the existence of the leverage effect for
all event types, like takeovers, selling of assets, equity and debt increases, or share
buybacks. Furthermore, our analysis clearly points at a size effect, meaning that the
extent of the capital structure change significantly impacts the implied volatility smile.
Therefore, we clearly differ fromGeske et al. (2016) aswe avoid static balance sheet
data which was already criticized in research in former times. Moreover, we are not
limited on the Geske (1979) model as we use transformed option prices in our empir-
ical analysis. Insofar we contribute to literature in two research areas: Firstly, to the
leverage effect strand and secondly, to the literature strand analyzing the determinants
of the smile. Consequently, we add explicitly to Pẽna et al. (1999), who mention e.g.
transaction costs (bid-ask spread), maturity, or relative market momentum as explana-
tory factors for the curvature of the implied volatility smile. We enrich the literature
which uses stock returns as proxy for leverage for example Branger and Schlag (2004)
or Ciliberti et al. (2009) do.
Thirdly,we contribute to the theoreticalmodels by deriving amethod to differentiate
the implied volatility function with respect to the moneyness. To this day only numer-
ical solutions are applied (see Toft and Prucyk 1997). By varying the market value of
debt and equity, and therefore the leverage of a company in the Geske (1979) com-
pound option model, we theoretically demonstrate the effect of changes of the capital
structure on the level, the slope, and the curvature of the implied volatility smile.
The paper is structured as follows. In Sect. 2 we develop the conceptual framework
for predicting effects of changes of the capital structure changes respectively of the
leverage effect in the implied volatility smile based on the Geske (1979) compound
option model. Section 3 presents the approach for testing the theoretical model and
therefore the design of the event study itself, and the selection of the events, explains
the implied volatility smile, and the measuring thereof. Later on in Sect. 4, we intro-
duce the enormous data set of ad-hoc news, Eurex, and Xetra data. We continue in
Sect. 5 with the results and discuss in Sect. 6 their impact in relation to previous
literature. The last section gives a short summary and conclusions of our findings.
2 Theoretical background
Our goal is to describe the influence of leverage on the implied volatility. Hence, we
need a model of market value debt and equity allowing at the same time options on
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equity. Academic literature provides several kinds of option pricing approaches to
model the market value of equity or debt of a firm. While Merton (1974), Black and
Cox (1976), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), or Briys and de Varenne (1997) focus on
the valuation of corporate debt on the basis of Black and Scholes (1973) firm value
dynamics, Leland and Toft (1996) estimate the optimal leverage for a firm and the
therewith associated corporate debt prices. Toft and Prucyk (1997) include corporate
taxes and bankruptcy costs in their option pricing model of the equity of a leveraged
firm. Hull et al. (2004) extend the Merton (1974) model by an implied volatility cali-
bration approach. Ericsson and Reneby (2005) evaluate the Merton (1974), Briys and
de Varenne (1997), and Leland and Toft (1996) models with regard to the estimation
possibilities via a Monte Carlo simulation. In contrast, Geske (1979) develops a com-
pound option model in which the stock price itself is an option written on the assets
of the firm with the debt as the exercise price.
While Leland and Toft (1996) or Toft and Prucyk (1997) use simulation studies, we
prefer a comparative static analysis. Therefore, to derive our hypotheses we build on
the compound option model by Geske (1979) as one possibility of including leverage
in an option pricingmodel and describe amethodwhich could also be applied for other
models to derive implied volatility functions. Hereafter, we follow Occam’s razor and
use this model due to its simplicity and ability to derive clear-cut predictions. Thus, we
take the Geske (1979) model, consider the comments on it by Lajeri-Chaherli (2002)
and Chen and He (2015), and define the price of the stock S of a firm as
S = V N1(h2+) − Me−rT2N1(h2−) (1)
where h j± = [ln(V /V̄ j )+ (r ± 0.5σ 2V )Tj ]/(σV
√
Tj ) for j = 1, 2, and V is the value
of the assets of the firm, M the face value of the debt (zero bond), σ 2V the instantaneous
variance of the return of the firm’s assets, r the risk-free interest rate, N1(·) cumulative
standard normal distribution, and T2 the maturity of the debt (note: in this notation
V̄2 = M).
Consequently, the price of the call option CG on S in the compound option model
is given by
CG = V N2(h1+, h2+, ρG) − Me−rT2N2(h1−, h2−, ρG) − Ke−rT1N1(h1−), (2)
where N2(·, ·, ρG) is the bivariate cumulative standard normal distribution with ρG =√
T1/T2, K the exercise price of the compound option, and T1 the maturity of CG .
For h1±, V̄1 represents the value V of the firm, implying the stock price of the firm
is equal to the exercise price of the compound option ST̄ − K = V̄1N1(h̄2+) −
Me−r T̄ N1(h̄2−) − K = 0, with h̄2± = [ln(V̄1/M) + (r ± 0.5σ 2V )T̄ ]/(σV
√
T̄ ) and
T̄ = T2−T1. For the put option PG case on S and also all the corresponding hypotheses
we refer to “Appendix E”.
To reveal the impact of a change in leverage of a company on the implied volatility
smile of observed option prices, we first define the leverage and second the implied
volatilities. For the leverage, we follow the classical definition of the leverage ratio
in corporate finance (L = M/S) and define an increase in leverage by an increase
123
100 A. W. Rathgeber et al.
of M . The reason for this decision is a purely technical one, due to a comfortable
handling in terms of financial mathematics. Second, according to the literature the
implied volatility σ imp is given as an implicit function IMP
σ imp = IMP(CBS, S, K , r , T1), (3)
with CBS as the call price obtained by the BS model resp. observed in the market. To
analyse the impact of changes in ratio L on the implied volatility smile, we differentiate
the given implied volatility with respect to M . Using the rules for differentiation of


















(−N2(h1−, h2−, ρG) + N1(d1)N1(h2−)) , (5)
where νS is the option’s vega. For details, refer to “Appendix A”. The partial deriva-
tives in the equation coincide with the economically expected argumentation. Higher
leverage leads ceteris paribus to either less equity and ergo lower stock and call prices,
whereas the latter implies lower implied volatility due to strictly positive vega of the
option and the former leads to higher implied volatility given a call price. It can be
shown that the lower stock price and therefore higher implied volatility effect strictly
dominates (see “Appendix A”), hence the derivative is always positive. This yields our
first hypothesis:
H1: If the leverage of a firm increases, the implied volatility increases accordingly.
To derive our second hypothesis, we need a measure for the slope of the implied
volatility curve2 (implied volatility as a function of strike) with respect to the strike
price. We find this measure by differentiating the implied volatility with respect to
the strike K . By applying the differentiation of the implicit function as well as of the














One can see that the slope resolves to zero when the second summand, the Geske call
price CG , is substituted by the BS model call price CBS , which is the well-known
result of a flat implied volatility curve in the BS model. This formula can be easily
1 Terms d1 and d2 are not redefined, but rather taken from the BS model and must only be adjusted with
the corresponding standard deviation σS and maturity T1.
2 Note that in the Geske (1979) model there is only a left wing of the smile observable. Therefore, we also
use in this context the term “curve” instead of smile.
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interpreted: startingwith thefirst summand, an increase in the strike leads to an increase
in implied volatility given a fixed call price. In addition, an increase in the strike results
in a lower Geske call price CG , which is ceteris paribus followed by a lower implied
volatility. In the Geske model one can show that the effect of lowering the implied
volatility dominates leading to negative slopes as expected (see “Appendix B” for the
proof).
To analyse the impact of a change in leverage, we must differentiate the slope
with respect to M . To simplify differentiations, we apply the theorem of Schwarz for





















































whereby α− = 1K√T1 − d2 and n1(·) is the univariate standard normal probability
density function. As can be seen in “Appendix C”, the slope of the implied volatility
curve decreases with rising leverage what means a stronger pronounced volatility
curve. Altogether, we can formulate the second hypothesis:
H2: If the leverage of a firm increases, the slope of the implied volatility curve decreases
and therefore the implied volatility curve is more pronounced.
Now, we derive our third and last hypothesis in which we require a measure for the
curvature of the implied volatility curve with respect to the strike price. We find this

























Note that CG only depends linearly on the strike, which contradicts the result of the
Black and Scholes (1973) formula, in which the underlying price (positive gamma)
as well as the strike price influence the option price in higher orders. Inserting the





























This equation is strictly positive and consequently the function is convex. For a proof,
see “Appendix D”. To demonstrate the impact of a leverage increase on the curvature










































































































This derivative depends on several effects. The overall effect is positive, tested by a
grid search. Therefore, a higher value of the derivative implies a more convex implied
volatility curve. Economically speaking, a higher leverage leads to a more convex
volatility curve. These insights are also in line with Toft and Prucyk (1997). Conse-
quently, we formulate our last hypothesis:
H3: If the leverage of a firm increases, the curvature of the implied volatility curve
increases and therefore the implied volatility curve is more convex.
As a robustness test for our theoretical model, we use the CEV model by Cox and
Ross (1976) and Beckers (1980) (see “Appendix F”).
3 Research design: methodology and data
3.1 Research design
We build the event study on the semi-strong form of market efficiency by Fama
(1970, 1991) as the change of a company’s leverage resulting from a corporate action
announced via ad-hoc news should be reflected by the market within a short time. This
approach coincides with a considerable stream of publications analysing the influence
of firm-specific announcements or special political events on option prices resp. on
implied volatilities or on stock prices. For example, Patell and Wolfson (1979) inves-
tigate the behaviour of option prices around the announcements of annual earnings,
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Sheikh (1989) focuses on the relation between stock splits and implied volatilities,
and Gemmill (1992) looks at the behaviour of FTSE index options around the 1987
election in Great Britain. Furthermore, Jayaraman and Shastri (1993) examine stock
returns and implied volatilities around the announcement date of dividend increases
andDonders andVorst (1996) study the implied volatility of call options around sched-
uled news announcements. Moreover, to conclude the brief event studies overview,
there are also studies like Masulis (1980) or Dann (1981) who directly look at the
impacts of capital structure changes on stock prices.
The following event study is designed in order to empirically test the impact of
changes in the leverage effect on the implied volatility smile, with the goal of analysing
the theoretically developed hypotheses in Sect. 2. An event is triggered by ad-hoc
news announcing a change in the capital structure of a DAX company due to a cor-
porate action. Basically, ad-hoc news is published in Germany by a specific company,
the so-called Deutsche Gesellschaft für Ad-hoc-Publizität mbH (DGAP). This fact
ensures that information relevant to stock prices is centrally distributed and that all
market participants have access to the same information at the same time. According
to Fama (1970, 1991) and the semi-strong form of market efficiency, an information-
efficient market will anticipate future volatility immediately after new information is
distributed. Therefore, effects on and changes in the market participants’ perceptions
on a company’s expected risk can be observed by comparing implied volatility smiles
on trading days before and after an event. Since news for multiple specific companies
and general market information reach the market, we benchmark the changes against
the DAX. To calibrate our models and to evaluate the event study, we use intra-day
Eurex equity options, Eurex DAX index options, and Eurex DAX futures, as well as
Xetra one-minute tick data. A more detailed description of this data, the events, and
the ad-hoc news follows in the next sections.
3.2 Events
We classify ad-hoc news affecting directly or indirectly the leverage of a company
into five categories: takeover/buying of shares (takeover), spin-off/selling of shares
(selling), increase of equity (equity increase), increase of debt (debt increase), and
share buyback (share buyback). Within each category we distinguish between financ-
ing activity and its corresponding effect on leverage. Hereinafter, basically “case 1”
stands for an increase in leverage and “case 2” represents a decrease in leverage. How-
ever, we have to distinguish between direct and indirect effects for “case 1” and “case
2”. Direct effects relate to the market value of debt in relation to market value of equity
and indirect effects affect the change of the riskiness of assets which changes the cash
flow distribution between debt holders and equity holders (redistribution hypothesis)
and hence ratiomarket value of debt and equity. This indirect effect appears at takeover
and selling of asset events in relation with cash activities as the redistribution hypoth-
esis effects from cash flow to equity resp. equity to cash flow and the impacts on
leverage can not clearly be separated. Therefore, we consider this particular situation
as “case 3” and do not consider these mixed events. Furthermore, if the transaction
does not affect the capital structure due to an asset deal in the same business or an equal
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debt or equity financing of the event, we describe this as “case 4”. However, we do
not consider these “case 4” events in the event study evaluations and therefore remove
these events from the sample. The degree of leverage is not easy to determine as we
consider market instead of balance sheet values. To estimate the degree of leverage
resp. the market values of debt and equity, models like Merton (1974), Geske (1979),
Leland and Toft (1996), or Toft and Prucyk (1997) etc. are necessary as mentioned
at the beginning of Sect. 2. However, this would drastically increase effort. For this
reason, we assume a capital structure of 50% equity and 50% debt as starting point.
Clearly a takeover/buying of shares or business units of other companies financed by
issuing new debt increases the leverage (“case 1”), whereas a transaction conducted
with the help of an equity increase decreases the leverage (“case 2”). A takeover
with retained earnings is a special kind of situation. From an accounting perspective,
retained earnings are considered as equity, but both balance sheet positions are nearly
risk-free and should be transferred to acquire risky shares of another company. In most
cases, the acquired company itself is leveraged, which increases this effect in market
values. Therefore, we classify this type of event as an increase in leverage (“case 1”).
Hence, a spin-off of parts of the company, selling of business units or subsidiaries, or
selling other share holdings in order to stabilize the balance sheet (retained earnings
resp. equity) reduces the leverage (“case 2”). While receiving additional equity by
the shareholders simply decreases the leverage, e.g. by stabilising the balance sheet
or paying back some debt (“case 2”), the effects of an increase of debt by obtaining
additional cash from the bondholders are more difficult to identify. The classifica-
tion and conditions of the bonds must be closely examined. Beyond classical bonds
increasing leverage (“case 1”), there are some bonds likemandatory convertible bonds,
Tier 1 bonds, or contingent convertible bonds, which have equity-like characteristics.
Therefore, all these bonds with a clear equity nature are classified as “case 2”. Addi-
tionally, many companies issue convertible bonds, offering the bond holders the option
to acquire shares of the company instead of the repayment of the bond’s face value.
There is a huge discussion about the impact of effects of convertible bonds on a com-
pany’s capital structure, as well as on the company’s motivations for issuing, and the
corresponding effects on stockmarkets. Janjigian (1987) shows, by comparing straight
debt and convertible bonds, that the equity component of the convertible bond is about
40–70% of its total value and that this could be enough for a decrease in leverage for
several companies. Furthermore, Stein (1992) and partially also Bancel and Mittoo
(2004) discover in a survey of European companies on financing decisions using con-
vertibles that the primary motivation for companies financing with convertible bonds
is to acquire a so called “delayed equity” or “equity through the back door” as well as
a “debt sweetener”. However, Mayers (1998) links the issue of convertibles to solving
the sequential-financing hypothesis and concludes that although the convertibles bring
some equity, new long-term debt is issued within the year of the conversion of the con-
vertible bond, and in general investment activities rise. As a consequence, he regards
convertible bonds as a popular and flexible financing opportunity for companies and
a good investment opportunity for institutional investors. As there is no clear decision
or trend for a definitive acceptance as equity in literature and rating agencies also do
not consider convertibles as equity, we decide to classify an increase in leverage for
convertible bonds (“case 1”). At last, all share buybacks in our sample are performed
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Table 1 Classification of corporate actions affecting the leverage
Corporate action Financing Leverage
Takeover Increase of debt Case 1
Reduction of retained earnings Case 1
Increase of equity Case 2
Reduction of cash Case 3
Asset deal Case 4
Equal increase of equity and debt Case 4
Selling of assets Reduction of equity Case 1
Reduction of debt Case 2
Increase of retained earnings Case 2
Increase of cash Case 3
Asset deal Case 4
Equal reduction of equity and debt Case 4
Equity increase Cash from stockholders Case 2
Debt increase Cash from classical bonds Case 1
Cash from bonds with clear equity characteristics Case 2
Cash from convertible bonds Case 1
Share buyback Reduction of cash/retained earnings Case 1
This table summarises the effects of different corporate actions depending on the financing structure and
its impact on the leverage effect. “Case 1” stands for an increase, “case 2” for a decrease, “case 3” for the
mixed effects, and “case 4” for no impact on the leverage. Note that a debt decrease mainly is linked with
other events (e.g. sellings) and therefore not explicitly listed
using cash/retained earnings and are consequently “case 1”. Table 1 provides a short
summary of the corporate actions and the kind of events applied in the event study.
3.3 Estimation of implied volatility smiles
We calculate implied volatilities for European options with the BS model and implied
volatilities for American options (with dividends) via the model by Barone-Adesi
and Whaley (1987). The implied volatility function is estimated according to the
methods suggested by Goncalves and Guidolin (2006), Masset andWallmeier (2010),
or Wallmeier (2015). The time-adjusted moneyness Mo(S, K , T , r , d) of the option
is given by









with dividend d only considered for the equity options.
This definition always assigns amoneyness of zero to at-the-money (ATM) options,
negative moneyness to in-the-money (ITM) calls resp. out-of-the-money (OTM) puts,
and a positive moneyness to OTM calls resp. ITM puts. Afterwards, we calculate the
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implied volatility function I V (Mo) with the cubic regression function
I V (Mo) = b0 + b1Mo + b2Mo2 + b3Mo3Du + ε, (13)
where b j ( j = 0, . . . , 3) are the regression coefficients, ε the random error, and Du
a dummy variable with
Du =
{
0 if Mo ≤ 0
1 if Mo > 0.
Du enables a better handling for the asymmetric behaviour of the implied volatilities
around a moneyness of zero.
Based on the implied volatility function [see Eq. (13)] and insights into the theoret-
ical model in Sect. 2, we build three measures for implications of the leverage effect on
the implied volatility smile: the level of the implied volatility (level), the slope (slope),
and the curvature (curvature) of Eq. (13). In order to ensure adequate comparisons of
each measure and the implied volatility smiles before and after the event as well as
with the benchmark, we define an interval with the left (bl ) and right bound (br ) in
order to evaluate Eq. (13). It holds that
bl = −0.4 resp. br = 0.1. (14)
All calculations of the three measures are done within this interval. This definition
leads to a consideration of mainly ITM calls, close OTM calls, OTM puts, and close
ITM puts within the implied volatility smiles. A reason for the bounds is that we notice
a high trading activity within these bounds for the generally less liquid equity options
compared to the DAX index options. In the context of the leverage effect, also risk and
therefore hedging aspects play an important role and lead to a focus on the left wing of
the smile, which is determined by OTM puts used for hedging [see Bollen andWhaley
(2004), in which results are verified for S&P500 index options]. Moreover, using this
interval we want to take into account the quite asymmetric behaviour around zero of
the time adjusted moneyness, which results from the logarithm. In order to facilitate
notation, we avoid using an additional index for the day after the event and the day
before the event as well as for equity and index options in the measures. The general
procedure is for allmeasures the same.At first,we calculate eachmeasure for the equity
options on the trading day before and after, calculate the relative change, and subse-
quently benchmark it with the corresponding DAX index option measure. Second, we
compare the result from the measure with the prediction of the event (see Table 1).





I V (mo j ), (15)
wheremo is a vector of 100 equidistant pointswithin the interval [bl , br ]. This approach
allows us to evaluate the implied volatility smile behaviour more precisely in the
123
The impact of the leverage effect on the implied… 107
Table 2 Effects on implied volatility smile
Level (H1) Slope (H2) Curvature (H3)
Case 1 Increase Decrease More convex (increase)
Case 2 Decrease Increase Less convex (decrease)
This table summarises effects of the two cases on the defined measures for the leverage effect on the implied
volatility smile, like the level, slope, and curvature
defined interval, than e.g. taking b0 of Eq. (13). Next, we look at the slope with the
measure (slope). The parameter b1 of Eq. (13) is responsible for the slope of the cubic
regression. However, we focus on the left wing of the implied volatility smile and not
on the whole smile, resulting in a slope measured by the mean over gradient slopes of
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mo j − mo j+1 . (16)
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For a brief overview of the curvature, see e.g. Weisstein (2002). With the help of the
three measurements of changes of the implied volatility smiles in connection with the
prediction for each event (“case 1” and “case 2”) of the leverage effect (see Table 1),
we receive the following effects when the measurement is equal our predictions of the
theoretical model and our hypotheses (Table 2).4
3 Note: If the gradient slope is positive for some points, we only consider the negative gradient slopes in
mo and consequently also adjust the size of mo.
4 For increased readability, we only refer to level, slope, and curvature, omit H1, H2, and H3 and only
speak of three hypotheses.
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For evaluation of our event study, a traditional hypothesis test is used. We test
our model’s goodness of fit via a binomial distribution. Therefore, we define the
hypothesis H0, that the empirical result resp. probability p is equal or lower p0 versus
the alternative hypothesis H1
H0 : p ≤ p0 and H1 : p > p0. (19)
We choose a level of 0.5 for p0 because it is exactly the expected probability if the
results are randomly drawn from the assumed binomial distribution. Additionally, we
do some robustness tests on several sub-samples,which requires taking into account the
small size of the samples, especially when testing the sub-samples for the distinction
of the event character. Therefore, we first test whether an approximation by the normal
distribution is applicable, in accordance with the common rule of thumb nE p0(1 −
p0) > 9 from Schader and Schmid (1989). nE stands for the number of events. In
the case that the approximation is not possible, we take the binomial distribution (see







p j0(1 − p0)nE− j ≤ αsig. (20)
H0 is rejected if the number of correct predictions is greater than the smallest value
of g. All tests are performed at significance levels αsig of 1%, 5%, and 10%.
Besides the robustness tests on several sub-samples, we also conduct some addi-
tional robustness tests with further models instead of the binomial distribution. We
define the difference between the relative change of the implied volatility smile of
the company and of the DAX itself as SM I LE for the level, slope, and curvature.
SM I LE is positive for an accurate prediction in “case 1” and negative for “case 2”
for the level and curvature. This approach is some kind of testing abnormal implied
volatility reactions as a results of changes in the capital structure. So far literature is
limited to abnormal returns, see e.g. Masulis (1980) or Dann (1981). For the slope,
the opposite holds—negative for “case 1” and positive for “case 2”. Based on this, we
define the regression model
SM I LE = ð1Dum1 + ð2Dum2 + ð3Dum3 + ð4Dum4 + ε, (21)
with
Dum1 = 1 if mc < medcase1 and “case 1” = 1 else 0
Dum2 = 1 if mc < medcase2 and “case 2” = 1 else 0
Dum3 = 1 if mc ≥ medcase1 and “case 1” = 1 else 0
Dum4 = 1 if mc ≥ medcase2 and “case 2” = 1 else 0
for testing if the differences between the companies’ and themarkets’ implied volatility
smile are related to the defined events and their size. mc is the relation between
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transaction volume announced in the ad-hoc news (net effect on leverage) and the
market capitalisation of the company at the end of the day before the event. medcase1
is the median of mc for “case 1” and medcase2 the median of mc for “case 2” events.
The first two tests presented above rely on the sample of events including leverage
effects. In contrast to this procedure, we randomly generate a second sample of events
(excluding the days of the ad-hoc news announcements and day before/after the event)
with the same companies as in the final event sample (definition see Sect. 4). This
means, for each company we randomly draw two consecutive days and conduct on
these days the same analyses for the implied volatility smiles as for the final event
sample. Note that we draw two random days for the implied volatility smiles as long as
the implied volatility smiles fulfil the same requirements (definition see section below)
as the final sample. Subsequently, we use a Wilcoxon rank sum test (see Wilcoxon
1945) in order to test if the effects (SM I LE) in our event sample are higher than
those of the random sample. Accordingly, we perform for the level and the curvature
a right-tailed hypothesis test with the null hypothesis that the median of SM I LE
of the event sample is smaller than the median of a random sample. Consequently,
the alternative hypothesis states that the median of the event sample is greater than
the median of a random sample. For the slope, we test the opposite. To avoid defining
sub-samples, wemultiply the results ofSM I LE byminus one for all events of “case




The event study includes all ad-hoc news published byDGAP forDAXcompanieswith
affected capital structure from 01.01.1999 to 31.12.2014. As such, the study covers
all events relating to the 30 companies that have been part of the DAX per 31.12.2014.
Furthermore, we also take companies into account that were not part of the DAX per
31.12.2014, but were rather part of the DAX earlier in the period, excepting Hoechst
AG (left 20.09.1999), Mannesmann AG (left 14.02.2000), Karstadt Quelle AG (left
19.03.2001), Dresdner Bank AG (left 23.07.2001), Degussa AG, (left 23.09.2002),
and Epcos AG (entered 14.02.2000 and left 23.12.2002). The reasoning behind the
exclusion is a missing listing of options of these six companies on EUREX. All in all,
the event study analyses ad-hoc news of 42 companies. Each of these ad-hoc news
provides a time stamp with day, hour, minute, and second information. We apply this
information for mapping the ad-hoc news with the option data.
In sum, we identified 513 ad-hoc news containing information about capital struc-
ture changes.However,much of this newsmust bewinnowed for the following reasons.
Often we face confounding events, meaning that the time window of the event study is
overlap, or the effect of the ad-hoc news is not clearly contributable to a specific event,
as in the case of ad-hoc news simultaneously announcing share buyback programs
and quarterly or annual results. Furthermore, in some cases the same corporate action
is subject to more than one ad-hoc news. For example, some companies announce a
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takeover first in one ad-hoc news, containing information that the company is in talks
concerning a takeover; then a very short period later, they present more details in a sep-
arate ad-hoc news. In this case, we consider the first ad-hoc news solely because this
instance contains newmarket information according to the efficient market hypothesis
by Fama (1970) and thereby influences prices of stocks and options. Additionally, for
some events it is not possible to identify the effect on the capital structure as clear
facts are missing e.g. missing information about the financing structure or the volume
of the transaction, as companies decide not to publish the buying/selling price. After
finishing this clearing process, we have a sample of 360 ad-hoc news reports on which
to start analyses. Unfortunately, 222 events must be additionally removed as there
are not enough traded options for the estimation of high quality and robust implied
volatility smiles (for definitions, see Sect. 4.4 below). The large number of removed
events can be explained as follows. We face a very long period for our event study
and at the beginning, trading volume and also trading activity on option markets resp.
Eurex wasmuch lower than it is today. Hence, more than two third of the removements
occurred before 2007. Moreover, option trading on smaller DAX companies like Fre-
senius SE, Merck KGaA, or Linde AG is even today significantly lower than on the
huge blue chips like Bayer AG, Deutsche Telekom AG, or Siemens SE. All in all, our
final sample of ad-hoc news consists of 138 events. Figure 1 provides an overview
of the events, classifying them based on mc. It also contrasts the original 360 events
and the 138 events remaining after removing the events lacking sufficient trading in
options. It becomes apparent that illiquidity affects all intervals, but the final sample
of events still covers a broad range of transactions over all intervals. A very positive
aspect of the sample is that about half of the transactions (“case 1” as well as “case 2”)
are greater than 5% of mc and about 10% of the transactions even greater than 20%
of mc. This structure of events allows further research e.g. on potential size effects.
Moreover, the final sample covers 74 “case 1” and 64 “case 2” transactions.
4.2 Eurex option and Xetra tick data
To estimate the implied volatility smiles of the companies, we use Eurex intra-day
option prices from 01.01.1999 to 31.12.2014 and the corresponding Xetra data. The
equity options are American style options and include dividends. Trading of equity
options is possible at Eurex from 08:55-20:00MEZ. We apply Eurex DAX index
options (trading period 08:50-20:30MEZ) and the Eurex DAX futures (trading period
07:50-22:30MEZ) as input for the benchmark. As a corresponding DAX index future
does not exist for every DAX index option maturity, we apply the mapping and adjust-
ment approach by Hafner and Wallmeier (2001). In contrast to equity options, the
index options are European style options. The intra-day data provides information
about trade price, trade size, and an intra-day time stamp up to centisecond for all
equity and index options. Our data set covers the equity options of the companies
described above as far as they have been already traded on Eurex in the period of the
event study. Eurex data is provided by Karlsruhe Kapitalmarktdatenbank.
We map the equity options with one-minute tick data provided by tickdatamar-
ket.com for the period from 2004 to 2014 and intra-day tick data aggregated to
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Fig. 1 Number of events in the event study classified according to mc. This figure shows the number of
events of the event study. It differentiates between the number of events with which we started our analysis
(left bars) and the number of events remaining after having removed events with too few options (right bars).
The events are sorted in various intervals of mc. Note that mc stands for the relation between transaction
volume as announced in the ad-hoc news (net effect on leverage) compared to the market capitalisation of
the company at the end of the trading day before the event
one-minute tick data from Karlsruhe Kapital-marktdatenbank for the period from
1999 to 2003. Therefore, the intra-day Xetra data includes all 1-min aggregated trades
from 09:00-17:35MEZ for each trading day. One-minute aggregated resp. One-minute
tick data means that it reflects only the last trade within a minute timeframe. The
corresponding interest rates for calculating the implied volatilities are obtained via
the Svensson model (see Svensson 1994) and the necessary parameters provided by
Deutsche Bundesbank.
4.3 Dividends andmarket capitalisation
The equity option data set includes several companies paying dividends within the
option maturity. Information about the dividends, like amount and ex-dividend date,
comes fromThomson Reuters datastream and is ultimatelymapped to the options. The
market capitalisation of the DAX companies at the end of the trading day is obtained
fromThomson Reuters datastream. The periods of dividends andmarket capitalisation
correspond to the Eurex and Xetra data.
4.4 Mapping events, options, and quality of implied volatility smiles
On the basis of trading hours at Eurex and Xetra, we define a trading day from 09:00-
17:35MEZ. The reason for the limitation is the need for Xetra data to calculate implied
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Equity options 11.46 12.12 43.70 54.83 0.79 0.77
DAX options 57.54 57.74 669.12 735.96 0.97 0.96
This table provides a short descriptive statistics for the equity and DAX options for the trading day before
and after the event by showing the average different strikes traded, average different prices traded, and the
R2. At different strikes and different prices traded, we distinguish between calls and puts and finally add
the results. We choose to measure different prices, as in some cases Eurex reports an executed order at one
price all involved bid resp. ask positions of different market participants. That is why the data contains at
the same time stamp several trades with the same price but of a different trade size. As we need to calculate
implied volatility curves, a broad spectrum of trades at different moneynesses are required; therefore, we
decide to use the restriction of different prices. Note that these calculations are based on the 138 events
fulfilling the liquidity requirements (enough prices, enough strikes, adequate R2) concerning the options
volatilities.We compute the implied volatility smile over the first complete trading day
before and after the event and thereby also look at the publishing time of the ad-hoc
news. For example, if the ad-hoc news is published before 09:00MEZ, the trading
day after is considered to be the actual day, or if the ad-hoc news is published after
17:35MEZ, then the trading day before is considered the actual day. To collate enough
options for the volatility smile, we use the nearest complete trading day before and
after for ad-hoc news published during a trading day. Eurex equity options are not as
liquid as the highly liquid DAX options for each maturity and each trading day, and
especially not for all maturities. In order to obtain stable and robust equity implied
volatility smiles, we always focus on the options series with a maturity of at least
20 days before the event. However, the equity options are the essential basis of the
event study. To ensure an appropriate quality of the implied volatility smiles and of the
results of the event study, we demand a minimum of three different strikes and seven
different option prices. Furthermore, the R2 of the cubic regression [see Eq. (13)]
must be at least 30%. These minimum requirements are valid for the equity implied
volatility smiles before and after the event. The partly weak trading activity of the
equity options leads in some cases to outliers in the option prices compared to other
prices, although lower and upper values for option prices are not broken. To obtain
a good fit of the equity implied volatility smiles, we eliminate these options with the
Cook-distance (see Cook 1977, 1979). For the required critical value in the Cook-
distance, we follow Bollen and Jackmann (1990) and use 4/(number of option prices).
All events with implied volatility smiles that do not meet these minimum requirements
are removed (222 events) and not considered in the results of the event study. Table 3
provides an overview of a descriptive statistics about average different traded strikes
and different traded prices for the options contained in the final sample and used for
calculating the implied volatility smiles. Moreover, it provides information about the
R2 of the cubic regression for estimating the implied volatility smile.A point of interest
emerges concerning the ad-hoc news and the trading activity on Eurex: for the equity
options we see an increase of 5% in different strikes (of respective options) traded and
an increase of about 25% in different prices (of the respective options) traded when
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comparing the day before to the trading day after the event. The estimation quality of
the implied volatility smiles is nearly 80% at a high level which ensures the basis for
our three measures is reliable. Of course, the DAX options are much more liquid than
equity options and the average R2 is of a very high quality.
5 Empirical evidence
Analysis of the impact of the leverage effect on the structure of the implied volatility
smile focuses on three different measures (level, slope, and curvature) as well as on
several sub-samples by clustering according to the type of an event (takeover, sell-
ing etc.), an increase (“case 1”) or decrease (“case 2”) prediction, or distinguishing
between transaction volume of the events in relation to the market capitalisation of the
company (> 5%,> 10%, and > 15%). The tests on the sub-samples also provide a
kind of robustness check. Furthermore, for several evaluations we look at the “at least
1” or “at least 2” category. This means we take the measurements of the level, slope,
and curvature and define that at least one resp. two out of these three measures must
be predicted correctly. As there is no statistical significance for the case when three
measurements are correctly predicted simultaneously, we renounce it in the tables.
After main analysis of the results, it follows two robustness tests: a regression based
approach as well as a comparison of the event sample to a random event sample.
First, we illustrate the impact of leverage with a typical example, such as a classi-
cal increase in equity: Thyssen Krupp AG announces equity increase by 10% (see
Fig. 2). We choose this example as it reveals several properties at the same time. It is
a perfect example as all three measures can be accurately predicted simultaneously,
with emphasis on benchmarking results of the equity implied volatility smile with the
DAX index implied volatility smile. Additionally, Fig. 2 demonstrates that there is less
trading activity on the right wing of the equity smile and that it is therefore reasonable
to prioritise the empirical study on the left wing of the implied volatility smile. For
description of effects of this event in more detail, see the notes below Fig. 2.
In aggregate, our findings reveal a clear and statistically significant existence of
the leverage effect on the German market [see Table 4; for all tables concerning the
binomial test, we show the number of the original events (column “Events”), the
number of events removed due to illiquidity (column “Removed”), and the number of
events predicted in the right resp. wrong direction (column “Right” resp. “Wrong”)].
While for the slope and the curvature we even observe highly significant results at a 1%
significance level (H0 : p ≤ p0 can be rejected),we seeweak effects for the level of the
implied volatility smile at a 10% significance level. In particular, the high significance
of the slope and curvature demonstrates that changes in capital structure affect the
left wing of the smile, which consists of OTM put options used for hedging purposes
and ITM call options. In the context of hedging, a decrease in leverage reduces the
expected future volatility, the therewith associated downside risk, and finally reduces
in consequence the hedging costs for market makers. On the other hand, an increase in
leverage also increases implied volatility as market makers face higher hedging costs.
Bollen and Whaley (2004) find that for S&P500 index options, net buying pressure
as a result of institutional investors’ demand for portfolio insurance increases the
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(a) (b)
Fig. 2 Thyssen Krupp AG announces equity increase by 10%
market makers’ hedging costs and raises implied volatility. Therefore, our results for
the equity options in the defined event window in relation to an increase (“case 1”)
or decrease (“case 2”) in leverage are similar, as e.g. a decrease of leverage could
reduce the net buying pressure of OTM put options by investors. Besides, analyses of
the three defined measures, we also look at the significance of one resp. two of the
three measures being significant at the same time for an event. For both cases we find
highly significant results at a 1% significance level. Particularly, the “at least 2” case
shows that our measures work well and that the leverage effect simultaneously affects
more than one measure of the implied volatility smile. By considering the “at least 1”
case, we see only 11 out of 138 events react in an unpredictable manner. This again
highlights the suitable performance of our theoretical model as developed in Sect. 2,
verifies our hypotheses, and demonstrates that leverage matters.
Next, we focus on analysis of the different impacts of event types on each measure
(see Table 5). The level of implied volatility smile is only significant for takeover
events. Selling events are close to but below the 10% significance level. However, for
the other events, significant results were not observed. One reason might be that the
mentioned measure level is particularly sensitive to huge transactions. The volume
involved in e.g. share buyback announcements remains in most cases below 5% of
the market capitalisation and only in a few exceptions reaches 10%. Therefore, the
announcement’s impact on the option market is not very large. In general, there are not
as many events in these three categories as in the takeover or selling announcement
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Table 4 Results—whole sample
for all three measures
Events Removed Right Wrong
Level 360 222 78* 60
Slope 360 222 84*** 54
Curvature 360 222 84*** 54
At least 1 360 222 127*** 11
At least 2 360 222 83*** 55
This table presents results for the level, slope, and curvature of the
implied volatility smiles for the whole data sample without distinction
between different events. Further it shows how many “at least 1” resp.
“at least 2” predictions of the three measures are right. All measures
are evaluated within moneyness from −0.4 to 0.1. Hereby, *** indi-
cates a 1% significance level, ** a 5% significance level, and * a 10%
significance level
categories making it much more difficult to achieve some statistical significance. The
slope of the implied volatility smile reveals better results than the level of the implied
volatility smile does. We see significant impact on the selling and debt increase events
and notice the takeover and share buyback events are onlymarginally in the area of non-
significance; however, a clear tendency does appear. The curvature obviously provides
the best results. Four out of the five event categories are statistically significant. Even
categories with fewer observations provide stable and significant results. Thus, we
conclude that the curvature generates independently from the event category, and
the case of leverage the best results. It seems that the curvature is the most sensitive
measure, as it is especially significant even for the share buyback events, whose impact
compared to the market capitalisation of the company is small.
Again, as for the whole sample, we evaluate the “at least 1” and “at least 2” cases
(see Table 6). While for the “at least 1” case, we see highly significant results, the “at
least 2” case only reveals very weak evidence, but a clear trend. An explanation for the
results of the “at least 2” case is that the requirements increase and the simultaneous
decrease in sample sizes again makes it more difficult to show statistical significance.
In a further robustness check, we investigate whether there are differences in quality
of the predictions between “case 1” and “case 2” (see Table 7). The slope is the only
measure showing significant results for both predictions. The other two measures are
at least in one case significant. Effects on the level are dominated by an increase in
leverage. Based on these insights, investors care more about an increase than about a
decrease in leverage.All in all, this sub-sample test shows that the prediction of implied
volatility smile changes and therefore our model works well in both directions—
for a decrease and an increase in leverage. In general terms, there exist no large
outliers concerning the predictive capability of our model and the reaction of implied
volatilities on changes in leverage of German companies.
Finally, we look at the impact of transaction size of the event compared to market
capitalisation of the company, whereby we concentrate on the 5%, 10%, and 15%
clusters (see Table 8). Taking higher percentages would not make sense due to lower
numbers of events in the respective sample. In contrast to the previous tests on the
sub-samples, there is, besides significant results, a very clear tendency for the few
non-significant sub-samples. Particularly, the level of implied volatility produces very
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Table 5 Results—level, slope,
and curvature changes in the
implied volatility smile
Events Removed Right Wrong
Level
Takeover 144 97 30** 17
Selling 106 65 23 18
Equity increase 33 20 6 7
Debt increase 27 13 8 6
Share buyback 50 27 11 12
Slope
Takeover 144 97 27 20
Selling 106 65 26** 15
Equity increase 33 20 6 7
Debt increase 27 13 10* 4
Share buyback 50 27 15 8
Curvature
Takeover 144 97 23 24
Selling 106 65 25* 16
Equity increase 33 20 10** 3
Debt increase 27 13 10* 4
Share buyback 50 27 16** 7
This table presents results for the level, slope, and curvature of the
implied volatility smiles which are evaluated within moneyness from
−0.4 to 0.1. Hereby, *** indicates a 1% significance level, ** a 5%
significance level, and * a 10% significance level
Table 6 Aggregated results—“at
least 1” resp. “at least 2”
correctly predicted changes in
the implied volatility smile
Events Removed Right Wrong
At least 1
Takeover 144 97 41*** 6
Selling 106 65 36*** 5
Equity increase 33 20 13*** 0
Debt increase 27 13 14*** 0
Share buyback 50 27 23*** 0
At least 2
Takeover 144 97 27 20
Selling 106 65 24 17
Equity increase 33 20 7 6
Debt increase 27 13 10* 4
Share buyback 50 27 15 8
This table presents aggregated results for “at least 1” resp. “at least 2”
correctly predicted changes at the same time for the level, slope, or
curvature of the implied volatility smile. Hereby, *** indicates a 1%
significance level, ** a 5% significance level, and * a 10% significance
level
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Table 7 Results—prediction
“case 1” or prediction “case 2”
Events Removed Right Wrong
Prediction “case 1”
Level 198 124 46** 28
Slope 198 124 46** 28
Curvature 198 124 42 32
At least 1 198 124 68*** 6
At least 2 198 124 49*** 25
Prediction “case 2”
Level 162 98 32 32
Slope 162 98 38* 26
Curvature 162 98 42*** 22
At least 1 162 98 59*** 5
At least 2 162 98 34 30
This table presents results of the prediction of change in leverage in
“case 1” (increase in leverage) or “case 2” (decrease in leverage).
Hereby, *** indicates a 1% significance level, ** a 5% significance
level, and * a 10% significance level
Table 8 Results—impact of transaction volume in relation to market capitalisation
Events Removed Right Wrong Right in %
> 5% mc
Level 217 144 45** 28 61.6
Slope 217 144 44** 29 60.3
Curvature 217 144 47*** 26 64.4
At least 1 217 144 70*** 3 95.9
At least 2 217 144 48*** 25 65.8
> 10% mc
Level 129 91 22 16 57.9
Slope 129 91 26** 12 68.4
Curvature 129 91 25** 13 65.8
At least 1 129 91 37*** 1 97.4
At least 2 129 91 26** 12 68.4
> 15% mc
Level 79 60 14** 5 73.7
Slope 79 60 13* 6 68.4
Curvature 79 60 11 8 57.9
At least 1 79 60 19*** 0 100
At least 2 79 60 13* 6 68.4
This table presents the results for all events with an impact > 5%, > 10%, and > 15% of mc and for all
our defined measures of the implied volatility smile. Hereby, *** indicates a 1% significance level, ** 5%
a significance level, and * a 10% significance level
123
118 A. W. Rathgeber et al.
Table 9 Robustness test—regression
Level Slope Curvature
ð1 0.0114 −0.1402 0.3257
[−19.27,19.3] [−708.03,707.75] [−6.9,7.56]
ð2 0.0209 −0.3111 7.8275*
[−20.72,20.76] [−761.5,760.87] [0.05,15.6]
ð3 22.4816* −824.936* 0.2613
[3.2,41.77] [−1532.82,−117.05] [−6.97,7.49]
ð4 −0.0041 −0.0089 −0.4588
[−20.74,20.73] [−761.19,761.18] [−8.23,7.32]
R2 0.0199 0.0199 0.0156
This table presents results for the robustness test, with a regression-based approach. The numbers in brackets
[·, ·] represent the confidence intervals for the estimated parameters of ð. The sample size is 138. Hereby,
*** indicates a 1% significance level, ** a 5% significance level, and a * 10% significance level
good results, with a significance level even higher than for the whole sample (see
Table 4). We conclude again that this measure is particularly sensitive to mc, while
the slope and curvature already react to smaller mc. These insights are in line with
the presumptions in the analysis for the share buyback event sub-sample. The “at
least 1” and “at least 2” cases also provide significant results over the four thresholds.
Regarding results for this sub-sample, in a nutshell a size effect is visible, despite a
small number of events in the sub-samples.
Having performed a test of the hypotheses with the binomial distribution, we run a
robustness test on a regression model [see Eq. (21)]. The results of the robustness test
(see Table 9) basically confirm the main findings outlined above. There are significant
estimators for ð3 for the level and slope for an increase in leverage for events with an
impact higher than themedian ofmc (for “case 1” themedian ofmc is 6.5%). For “case
2” only events with an impact lower than the median of mc (for “case 2” the median of
mc is 4.9%) and for the curvature are significant, but with the wrong sign. These two
main results are in line with the sub-samples from the binomial test. The significance
of the results for the curvature sinks with increasing mc (see samples 10% and 15%)
while the significance stays stable for the level and slope, despite decreasing sample
sizes. Non-significant results have the correct sign for all “case 1” situations (ð1,ð3),
which shows that at least the trend is correct. However, the signs are only partially
correct for “case 2” predictions (ð2,ð4). These results demonstrate that investors care
more about an increase than a decrease in leverage. A bigger event sample probably
would improve the results as the rather small sample of 138 observations has been
categorised by 4 dummy variables into four roughly equal sized clusters of “1” and “0”
observations. Based on sample size, event type, andmc, there are about one quarter “1”
and three quarters “0” in each dummy vector. All in all, this robustness test confirms
weak effects of a change in leverage on the implied volatility smile and particularly
highlights a size effect for events relating to an increase in leverage.
Finally, Table 10 presents the robustness test covering the differences between the
effects of the event sample and a random sample by a Wilcoxon rank sum test. The z-
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Table 10 Robustness
test—Wilcoxon rank sum test
Level Slope Curvature
z-value 1.3650* 1.6093 1.6643**
(0.0861) (0.9462) (0.0480)
This table presents results for the Wilcoxon rank sum test. The z-
value stands for the test statistic. The numbers in brackets (·) show the
corresponding p-value. Hereby, *** indicates a 1% significance level,
** a 5% significance level, and * a 10% significance. Significance
levels are reported for the rejection of the null hypothesis
values have the correct sign, except for the slope. This fact demonstrates that changes
in the implied volatility smiles in the event sample are (in direction) higher than in the
random sample. For the level, the null hypothesis (median SM I LE event sample is
smaller than medianSM I LE random sample) can be rejected at a 10% significance
level and for the curvature, the null hypothesis can be even rejected at a 5% significance
level. To sum up, these results show that the effects of the leverage effect sample are
higher than on random days and therefore a leverage effect exists.
6 Discussion
In general, the event study idea, in connection with isolating leverage on the basis of
ad-hoc news and benchmarking the results with the change of the implied volatility
smiles of the market (DAX), confirms the leverage effect on implied volatilities. We
find significant results for the leverage effect hypothesis for the level, slope, and
curvature of the implied volatility smile. Tests on sub-samples and robustness tests
demonstrate the stability of the results. Therefore our results are in line with the latest
comprehension of the existence of the leverage effect in literature by Bollerslev et al.
(2006), Aït-Sahalia et al. (2013) or Wang and Mykland (2014). By using the Heston
stochastic volatility model, a logarithmic two-factor stochastic volatility model, and
high-frequencyS&P500 index data, Bollerslev et al. (2006) identify a leverage effect as
well as a volatility feedback effect, and conclude that only risk-based explanations (see
e.g. Campbell and Hentschel 1992) are no longer adequate for explaining asymmetric
volatility. They state that a huge market decline over a five-minute interval raises
market volatility (level and historically) and the effects of this uncertainty last several
days. Aït-Sahalia et al. (2013) also apply aHeston stochastic volatilitymodel and high-
frequency data (S&P500 and Microsoft Corp. one-minute ticks), but at the same time
conduct several error corrections, like e.g. discretisation errors, smoothing errors, or
noise correction errors. After all these adjustments, they demonstrate an even stronger
existence of the leverage effect. Wang and Mykland (2014) use a non-parametric
estimator for the leverage effect and integrate it into a stochastic volatility model.
Hereby, the leverage effect is calculated by covariation between the returns and a
function of the return volatility. In contrast to these three recent studies, we do not
have to eliminate any error terms – a huge criticismof earlier studies based on historical
volatility. Furthermore, we do not base our empirical study on thewell-known negative
correlation between returns and their volatility, the so-called down-market effect by
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Figlewski andWang (2000). We completely focus on changes of the implied volatility
smiles, which represent the market participants’ future expectations of change in the
leverage initialised by ad-hoc news. However, we are in line with the latest literature in
using high-frequency data. Hereby, we also develop a theoretical proof of the effects
of the leverage effect on the level, slope, and curvature on the implied volatility smile
in the Geske (1979) compound option model. We provide a very strict selection of the
equity implied volatility smiles, benchmark them to the implied volatility smile of the
market (DAX), face a very short event window, and ensure, due to the strict selection
of the events itself, a unique data sample and methodology. Of course, the DAX as
benchmark is only the best available proxy. It might be discussed, if the weightings
of the companies in the DAX index are equal to weightings in the DAX implied
volatility smile. But this might be not the case. DAX index weightings are determined
by figures like free-float, market capitalisation, or trading volume, while DAX implied
volatilities show expected volatility. However, the individual composition of the DAX
implied volatility smile is on its own a huge topic for future research. Moreover, as
mentioned in the introduction there is a close relation between the leverage effect
hypothesis and the volatility feedback hypothesis [for a discussion see also Bekaert
and Wu (2000) and Wu (2001)]. Our focus lies solely on the leverage hypothesis. To
get some impressions of the impact of shocks caused by the events on the stock prices
of the companies, we do a simple test and compare closing prices of the stocks on
the day before and after the event. This test can be seen as a proxy for the volatility
feedback hypothesis and if shocks lead to falling stock prices. For “case 1” 41 out
of 74 stock prices go down, while for “case 2” 36 out of 64 go up. Both situations
are non-significant according to a binomial test. However, our results for the implied
volatility smile show a significant result for both predictions (see Table 7). Therefore,
our results indicate that it is the leverage hypothesis and not the volatility feedback
hypothesis explaining asymmetric volatility. In reference to the available data, a more
detailed analysis testing the volatility feedback hypothesis on the equity market and
a comparison of these effects to this event study would be possible. For example, in
line with the methodology by Bollerslev et al. (2006), it can be examined the time of
an increased volatility after an event (shock). At last, we discuss the time to maturity
of the option in relation to the event type. While, e.g. an increase in debt can be
announced by ad-hoc news and conducted by an accelerated book-building within a
very short timeframe within option maturity, the definitive completion of a takeover
can take much longer and be out of option maturity. To best of our knowledge, there
is no literature dealing with this issue in the context of option markets and event
studies. Therefore, we handle this issue by applying the concept of efficient markets
by Fama (1970, 1991) that all new information is priced immediately as there is a
certain probability that the change of capital structure takes places within the maturity
of the option, and assume that the definitive completion date does not play a role. For
most corporate events, this date would not even be available, even if liquidity for equity
options with a long maturity significantly decreases. This fact would lead to less stable
equity implied volatility smiles and again reduce the number of events. To obtain even
more significant and more reliable results, a greater sample size of events would be
desirable, as particularly in the first years of the time period regarded for many events,
insufficient intra-day option trades are available at Eurex, and must consequently be
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removed. The same problem arises for the rather small DAX companies, as we do
not have enough option trades before and after the event to calibrate the models in
the event study. Nevertheless, this event study contributes by using implied instead of
historical volatility, an approach requiring no measurement of correction errors due
to the isolation of different types of leverage influencing actions, a theoretical model
including nonlinear effects and finally demonstrates that leverage matters.
7 Conclusion
This work provides new evidence for the leverage effect, which is part of the well-
known and discussed phenomenon of asymmetric volatility in financial markets and
extends the results as well as the approach of Geske et al. (2016). Based on extension
of the Geske (1979) compound option model by the leverage effect, we demonstrate
theoretically the effects of changes in the capital structure of German companies
on the implied volatility smile. Accordingly, we concentrate on the level, slope, and
curvature of the implied volatility smile. Hence, we provide a framework for analytical
analysis of other models. With help of a unique ad-hoc news data set for the leverage
changes of the DAX companies from 1999 to 2014 and the use of intra-day option
prices, we find significant evidence for the existence of the leverage effect. Robustness
tests on sub-samples of the ad-hoc news demonstrate the significance of the leverage
effect on various groups of corporate events, such as takeovers, selling of assets, debt
increases, equity increases, or share buybacks. Furthermore, the model shows robust
results for an increase as well as a decrease in leverage and particularly highlights that
the change of level of the implied volatility depends on the transaction volume of the
event compared to the market capitalisation of the company. Besides, we generally
see higher impacts on the implied volatility smiles in the leverage effect event sample
compared to a random event sample. All in all, we believe that the unique combination
of a theoretical model and an event study for explaining asymmetric volatility shows
the importance of the leverage effect for this area of research.
Even though we have provided new insights into this phenomenon, our results
are only valid for the German market and some of our sub-samples are very limited,
due to liquidity reasons—for the impact of liquidity on implied volatility smiles see
Rathgeber et al. (2020). For example, a study on the European or US market might
gather greater sub-samples and provide the possibility of branch comparisons. To sum
up, our findings create an important step in the linkage between corporate capital
structure changes, implied volatility smiles, and the leverage effect, and provide a
foundation for further research.
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Appendix A
By using σ imp = I MP(CBS, S, K , r , T1)we differentiate the implied volatility func-
tion with respect to M . Applying the rules for differentiation of inverse functions as
well as for differentiation of implicit functions,
∂σ imp
∂M































































(−N2(h1−, h2−, ρG) + N1(d1)N1(h2−)) . (A.7)
Both factors are positive: the first factor by definition of e−rT2 and νS , and the second
factor by the fact that the joint probability N2 is always smaller than the product of




and N1(h1−) < N1(d1).
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Appendix B
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In case of the BS model, CG is substituted by CBS , leading to the well-known and
discussed ∂σ
imp







For the latter, see Geske (1979), page 72 formula (15); the first can be derived analo-
gously to other Greeks of the BS model. Hence, it follows that
∂σ imp
∂K
= e−rT1 N1(d2) − N1(h1−)
νS
. (B.6)
The slope’s sign depends only on the sign of the numerator, because the exponential
function and νS are strictly positive. If d2 < h1−, the numerator is negative, and vice
versa.
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the left-hand side is always larger than the right-hand side. Consequently the slope is
always negative. Note that V (∂S/∂V = N1(h2+)) represents the stocks delta with
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where
α− = 1K√T1 − d2. (C.6)
For beginning analysis of the effects it is most suitable to concentrate on the first
two lines. vs , e−rT2 , and ∂vS/∂K are positive by definition. Note that although σ imp
decreases with increasing K , the sensitivity is positive. Altogether with insights from
Eq. A.7 the minuend (always positive) is always smaller than the subtrahend (always
positive). Finally, we have a negative sign, which means a more negative slope when
the leverage ratio L resp. debt M rises.
Appendix D
We start with the already derived result from Eq. B.6 and differentiate with respect to








νS − (N1(d2) − N1(h1−)) ∂νS∂K
ν2S
(D.1)
















































Effects can be analysed best in Eq. D.1. Again, vS , e−rT1 , and ∂vS/∂K are positive by
definition and (N1(d2) − N1(h1−)) is negative as reasoned above. The numerator is
always positive as the subtrahend (always negative) is always smaller than theminuend
(always negative). Therefore, the overall effect is always positive and the function is
convex.
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Appendix E
This section briefly describes the validity of our theoretical model for the put option
in the compound option model. The price of the put option PG on S in the compound
option model is given according to Hull (2017) by
PG = Me−rT2N2(−h1−, h2−,−ρG) − V N2(−h1+, h2+,−ρG) + Ke−rT1N1(−h1−).
(E.1)
The implied volatility σ imp of PG is an implicit function I MP with respect to the put
option PBS of the BS model by σ imp = I MP(PBS, S, K , r , T1).
Hypothesis (H1)













After applying the same rules as for the call option, the corresponding partial deriva-
tives and the properties of the (bivariate) normal standard distribution N1(h2−) =

















(−N2(h1−, h2−, ρG) + N1(d1)N1(h2−)) .
(E.3)
Hypothesis (H2)
For the effect of the leverage on the slope of the implied volatility for put options, we
modify the theoretical model as follows
∂σ imp
∂K
= ∂ I MP
∂K





























In case of the BS model, PG is substituted by PBS leading of course to the well-
known and discussed ∂σ
imp










= e−rT1 N1(d2) − N1(h1−)
νS
, (E.6)
which is exactly the same result as for call option.
To evaluate ∂
2σ imp









































∂S and again the help of N1(h2−) =
















(−N2(h1−, h2−, ρG) + N1(h2−)N1(d1)) ,
(E.8)
which is exactly the same result as for the call option.
Hypothesis (H3)
For the first part of the third hypothesis for put options we can refer to B.6 and E.6
and therefore, the results from D.1 to D.4 are also valid. In line with the approach for
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In line with the results for the call option case, this derivative depends again on several
effects, whereby a grid search reveals that the overall effect is positive and confirms
that a higher leverage leads to a more convex volatility curve.
Appendix F
Looking at the Constant Elasticity Model (CEV) for option prices there is the general
formulation, if the stock price follows aCEVdiffusion (Cox andRoss 1976). However,
our goal was to introduce a general pathway how to transform our theoretical results
derived with the compound option model also to CEV. Consequently, we build on
the more traceable absolute value model of Cox and Ross (1976), in the version of
Beckers (1980). In this version the call option price is defined by













y2 = − κ2
ve
(F.14)
κ1 =S − Ke−rT (F.15)
κ2 =S + Ke−rT . (F.16)
To make our general formulas applicable, we need to derive the derivatives of CCEV
with respect to the leverage as well as to the strike price K . Whereas the latter is
included in the formulas, the dependency to the leverage is not part of the CEVmodel.
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However, this assumption is debatable and not part of Beckers (1980). Consequently
















= − y1n(y1) (F.22)
∂n2(y2)
∂ y2
= − y2n(y2) (F.23)
∂κ1
∂K












The second step is to calculate the derivatives of the option price with respect to σ , S

































= ζ (n(y1) − n(y2)) > 0. (F.28)
The latter is true, because the standard normal density is axial symmetric around the
ordinate including a maximum at 0.With |y1| < |y2| the inequality is straight forward.





























= e−rT (N (y2) − N (y1)) < 0. (F.30)
The latter is true because y2 < y1.
For changes in the leverage L we derive
∂σ imp
∂L








(n(y1) − n(y2)) ∂σ
∂L
> 0. (F.31)


















the result is depending on the sign of d1. For negative d1 the result is positive which
is in contrast to the result derived by the compound option model.
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the result is depending on the sign of d1. For negative d1 the result is positive which
is in line with the result derived by the compound option model.
Alternatively, we assume a negative relationship between the stock price and the




The derivative of CCEV with respect to S reads as follows
∂CCEV
∂S
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with ∂ y1
∂S = 1ve and
∂ y2
∂S = − 1ve . Therefore, it holds
∂CCEV
∂S
= N (y1) + N (y2) > 0. (F.36)
For changes in the leverage L we derive
∂σ imp
∂L
















Altogether, we cannot draw a final conclusion in this case, because we do not exactly
know which term is dominant.
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